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WHAT IS NEXT FOR THE OROMO PEOPLE?1
Asafa Jalata, PhD,
Professors of Sociology and Global Studies, and Interim Chair of the Africana Studies Program
at the University of Tennessee – Knoxville
Thank you for inviting me to give a talk on the future of the Oromo people. To try to speculate
on the future of the Oromo people is a very challenging task. Nevertheless, I try my best
depending on my knowledge of the Oromo colonial history and national struggle in relation to
the Ethiopian colonial state. Currently, the Oromo people and their national struggle are at a
crossroads because of three major reasons. First, since the Oromo people are engaged in national
struggle for self-determination, statehood, sovereignty, and democracy, the Tigrayan-led
Ethiopian government is systematically attacking and terrorizing them. Second, at the same time,
the Oromo elites who suppose to provide guidance and leadership for the Oromo national
movement are fragmented, ideologically confused, and have failed to understand the lethal
danger the Oromo people are facing from the Habasha colonizing elites. Third, the Oromo
people are suffering from absolute poverty, recurrent famines, and malnutrition because the
Meles regime and its supporters loot their economic resources.
In addressing these three complex problems, I focus on five central issues. First, I explore
the past and current status of the Oromo nation under Ethiopian colonialism. Second, I identity
and explain the strengths and weaknesses of the Oromo elites in organizing and leading the
Oromo national movement. Third, I explain the main characteristics of Oromo society. Fourth, I
briefly identify the major opportunities and obstacles of the Oromo struggle. Finally, I suggest
some urgent and practical measures that the Oromo elites and society should take to ensure the
survival Oromia and to achieve national victory.
The Past and Current Status of the Oromo People
The Ethiopian colonial terrorism and genocide that started during the last decades of the 19th
century still continue in the 21st century. Ethiopia, former Abyssinia, terrorized and committed
genocide on the Oromo people during the Scramble for Africa with the help of European
imperial powers and the modern weapons they received from them.2 During Ethiopian colonial
expansion, Oromia, “the charming Oromo land, [would] be ploughed by the iron and the fire;
flooded with blood and the orgy of pillage.”3 Calling this event as “the theatre of a great
massacre,” Martial De Salviac states,
The conduct of Abyssinian armies invading a land is simply barbaric. They contrive a sudden irruption,
more often at night. At daybreak, the fire begins; surprised men in the huts or in the fields are three quarter
massacred and horribly mutilated; the women and the children and many men are reduced to captivity; the
soldiers lead the frightened herds toward the camp, take away the grain and the flour which they load on
the shoulders of their prisoners spurred on by blows of the whip, destroy the harvest, then, glutted with
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booty and intoxicated with blood, go to walk a bit further from the devastation. That is what they call
‘civilizing a land.’4

The Oromo oral story also testifies that Ethiopians/Abyssinians destroyed and looted the
resources of Oromia, and committed genocide on the Oromo people through massacre, slavery,
depopulation, cutting hands, famine, and diseases during and after the colonization of Oromia.
Recognizing this tragedy, “the Oromo said: ‘It is Waaqa [God] … who has subjected us to the
Amhara.’”5 According to Martial De Salviac, “With equal arms, the Abyssinia [would] never
[conquer] an inch of land. With the power of firearms imported from Europe, Menelik
[Abyssinian warlord] began a murderous revenge.”6 The colonization of Oromia involved human
tragedy and destruction: “The Abyssinian, in bloody raids, operated by surprise, mowed down
without pity, in the country of the Oromo population, a mournful harvest of slaves for which the
Muslims were thirsty and whom they bought at very high price. An Oromo child [boy] would
cost up to 800 francs in Cairo; an Oromo girl would well be worth two thousand francs in
Constantinople”7
The Ethiopian government massacred half of the Oromo population (five million out of
ten million) and their leadership during its colonial expansion. 8 According to Alexander
Bulatovich (2000: 68-69), “The dreadful annihilation of more than half of the population during
the conquest took away from the Gallas [Oromos] all possibilities of thinking about any sort of
uprising. . . . Without a doubt, the Galla, with their least five million population, occupying the
best land, all speaking one language, could represent a tremendous force if united.” The
destruction of Oromo lives, institutions, and Oromian natural beauty were aspects of Ethiopian
colonial terrorism. The surviving Oromos who used to enjoy an egalitarian democracy known as
the gada system9 were forced to face state terrorism, political repression, and an impoverished
life. Bulatovich explains about the gada administration and notes that “the peaceful free way of
life, which could have become the ideal for philosophers and writers of the eighteenth century, if
they had known it, was completely changed. Their peaceful way of life is broken; freedom is
lost; and the independent, freedom loving Gallas find themselves under the severe authority of
the Abyssinian conquerors.”10
Ethiopian colonialists also destroyed Oromo natural resources and the beauty of Oromia.
Oromia was “an oasis luxuriant with large trees” and known for its “opulent and dark greenery
used to shoot up from the soil.”11 De Salviac also notes that “the greenery and the shade delight
the eyes all over and give the landscape richness and a variety which make it like a garden
without boundary. Healthful climate, uniform and temperate, fertility of the soil, beauty of the
inhabitants, the security in which their houses seem to be situated, makes one dream of
remaining in such a beautiful country.”12 The Abyssinian colonialists devastated “the forests by
4
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pulling from it the laths for their houses and [made] campfires or firewood for their dwellings. . .
. [They were] the great destructors of trees, others [accused] them of exercising their barbarity
against the forests for the sole pleasure of ravaging.”13 Bulatovich applied to Oromia the phrase
“flowing in milk and honey”14 to indicate its abundant wealth in cattle and honey.
The Ethiopian colonial state gradually established settler colonialism in Oromia and
developed five major types of colonial institutions, namely, slavery, the colonial landholding
system, the nafxanya-gabbar system (semi-slavery), the Oromo collaborative class, and garrison
and non-garrison cities. It introduced the process of forced recruitment of labor via slavery and
the nafxanya-gabbar (semi-slavery) system.15 The colonial state expropriated almost all Oromo
lands and divided up the Oromo among colonial officials and soldiers and their collaborators to
force them to produce agricultural commodities and food for local consumption and an
international market. The Oromo farmers were reduced to serfs or slaves or semi-slaves and
coerced to work without remuneration for the settlers, intermediaries, and the colonial state for
certain days every week. Whenever they failed to provide free labor or pay taxes or tributes, the
settlers enslaved their children or wives.
The colonial terrorism that started during the reign of Menelik has continued under
successive Ethiopian governments. The Haile Selassie government continued the policies of
Menelik until it was overthrown by the popular revolt of 1974. The Selassie government
terrorized the Oromo of Raya-Azabo, Wallo, Hararghe, Bale and other regions because of their
political and cultural resistance to the Amhara-Tigray domination. It also imprisoned, tortured or
hanged prominent Oromo leaders, such as Mamo Mazamir and Haile Mariam Gamada who
organized and led the Macca-Tuulama Self-Help Association in the early 1960s. The military
regime that emerged in 1974 under the leadership Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam continued
state terrorism, dictatorship, and Ethiopian colonial policies. Currently, the Meles regime is
continuing similar colonial policies and practices in Oromia and other places.
When Oromo activists and the people started to resist the military regime, it intensified
its state terrorism. The Military regime (derg) and its supporters committed massive human
rights violations in the name of the so-called Revolution. According to Norman J. Singer,
Those killed in the first three months of the campaign of the ‘Red Revolutionary Terror' . . . numbered
around 4000-5000 [in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) alone], the killings continued in March 1978, spreading to
the rest of the country . . . Those detained for political instruction numbered from 30,000 upwards . . .
Torture methods emphasized in the Red Terror . . . included severe beating on the head, soles of the feet . . .
and shoulders, with the victim hung by the wrists or suspended by wrists and feet from a horizontal bar . . .
; sexual torture of boys and girls, including pushing bottles or red-hot iron bars into girls' vaginas; and other
cruel methods.16

The derg continued its mass imprisonments and killings. In 1980, one Oromo source
mentioned that "the Oromo constitutes the majority of the more than two million prisoners that
glut Ethiopia's jails today"17 In the 1980s, thousands of Oromo nationalists were murdered or
imprisoned; the regime also terrorized other elements of Oromo society. According to Gunnar
13
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Hasselblatt, the military government
repeatedly held mass shooting among the Oromo population, hoping to break the free, independent Oromo
spirit. Sometimes a hundred, sometimes two hundred men were shot on this raised dry field . . . and were
buried with bulldozers. Over years this procedure was repeated several times. When the method did not
work and the Oromo population could not be forced into submission, other methods were used. The victims
were made to lie down with their heads on stone, and their skulls were smashed with another stone. The . . .
government . . . tried everything to consolidate its reign of terror and exploitation of Oromia . . . . When the
Oromo movement could not be quenched by shooting or by the smashing of skulls, [the government] came
up with a new idea. Men’s testicles were smashed between a hammer and an anvil. Three men tortured and
maimed in this way are still living.18

Ethiopia has maintained its oppressive and repressive structures on the Oromo by the assistance
of successive global powers, namely, Great Britain, the United States, former Soviet Union, and
China.19 As the former USSR supported the Mengistu regime, the US, powerful European
countries and China are supporting the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian government.
Since 1992, the Tigrayan authoritarian-terrorist regime20 has controlled the Oromo and
denied them the freedom of expression, association, organization, the media, and all forms of
communication and information networks. This government has been focusing on brutally
attacking the Oromo national movement led by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and on
robbing the economic resources of Oromia in order to enrich the Tigrayan elites and their
collaborators and to specifically develop the Tigrayan region. To achieve its political and
economic objectives, the regime primarily uses its puppet organization known as the Oromo
People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) which was created and is today controlled by the
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF); the OPDO is led by Tigrayan cadres, elements of
Oromo speaking colonial settlers, and opportunistic Oromos who would do anything in exchange
for luxurious lifestyles.
The minority Tigrayan-led Ethiopian government is attempting to give a final solution for
a large political problem that has existed for several centuries—the relationship between the
Oromos and their Amhara-Tigrayan colonizers. As we know from history, the policy of targeting
and exterminating indigenous peoples exists in different parts of the world, and it has been an
integral practice of the racialized capitalist world system since the 16th century. While claiming
to promote Christian civilization, modernity, and commerce, European colonialists exterminated
indigenous peoples in the Americas, Australia, Asia, and Africa over a period of several
centuries in order to transfer their resources to European colonial settlers and their descendants.
Specifically, the plans and actions that King Leopold of Belgium had for the Congo or Andrew
Jackson of the United States for the Cherokees or colonial Germany for the Herero and Nama
peoples in South West Africa (Nambia)21 are very similar to the grand plan and action the Meles
government has for the Oromo nation.
18
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The Meles regime is now completing the forced removal of Oromos from the areas
surrounding Finfinnee (Addis Ababa).22 Furthermore, by evicting the Oromo farmers from their
homelands with nominal or without compensation, the Meles regime has already leased several
millions of hectares of Oromo lands to so-called investors from China, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia,
India, Malaysia, Nigeria, as well as from Europe.23 If the policy of land expropriation is allowed
to continue Tigrayans, Chinese, Djiboutians, Indians, Malaysians, Nigerians, Arabs and
Europeans will soon replace the Oromo people. Meles never sold or leased Tigrayan lands, but
has expanded modern agricultural development in his homeland, Tigray. When the Oromo are
to terrorize the people and force them to work for the king. This organization is similar to the organization of Meles Zenawi
called the OPDO that imposes a reign of terror on the Oromo people. Similarly, in his book, Blood and Soil: A World History of
Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur, Ben Kiernan (2007) explains how it took four centuries to decimate the
indigenous peoples of the Americas through war, genocide, terrorism, diseases, and removal. He particularly discusses how the
president of the United States, Andrew Jackson, destroyed the Cherokee Nation by removing them from their homelands and
sending them to reservations. Jackson and his supporters and white settlers created civil war among the leadership of the
Cherokee and made them to fight one another. In The Trail of Tears and Indian Removal, Amy H. Sturgis (2007) explores how
the United States practiced racial or ethnic cleansing on the Cherokee nation. When the Cherokee people were removed from
Georgia between 1838 and1839, about eight hundred Cherokee perished, and they arrived in Oklahoma without any children and
only a few elders. When the Herero and Nama peoples of Namibia resisted Germany colonialism, the German soldiers and
settlers developed a plan to carry out a shoot-to-kill policy. They conducted extrajudicial killings, established concentration
camps, and employed forced labor and death camps. The German colonial governor expressed the plan of Germany: “15 years
from now, there will not be much left of the natives” (quoted in Kiernan, 2007: 381). This plan was implemented between 1904
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facing abject poverty and hunger, Tigrayan elite who depended on international food aid in the
1980s for their survival, are rich and powerful today. The Meles regime also sells Oromo
minerals and other natural resources while evicting and impoverishing the Oromo people.
Whenever the Oromo resist, the regime mercilessly brutalizes or kills them.
The political and military leaders of the Meles government are literally gangsters and
robbers; they use state power to expropriate state corporations and lands in the name of
privatization—all with the blessing of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In
achieving its political and economic objectives, the Meles regime has been engaging in political
repression, state terrorism, genocidal massacres, and gross human rights violations in Oromia
and other regional states. Since the Oromo people have been resisting to Tigrayan colonial
policies, they have been targeted by the Meles regime; they have been attacked and terrorized
because of their economic resources, their acceptance of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) as
their national leadership, and their refusal to submit to the orders of Tigrayan authorities and
their collaborators.
This regime has banned independent Oromo organizations including the OLF and
declared war on those organizations and the Oromo people. It even outlawed Oromo journalists
and other writers and closed down Oromo newspapers. As Mohammed Hassen asserts, “The
attack on the free press has literally killed the few publications in the Oromo language in the
Latin alphabet. The death of Oromo publications . . . has been a fatal blow to the flowering of
Oromo literature and the standardization of the Oromo language itself. The Oromo magazines
that have disappeared include Gada, Biftu, Madda Walaabuu, Odaa, and the Urjii magazine . . .
Since 2002, there has not been a single newspaper or magazine that has expressed the legitimate
political opinions of the Oromo in Ethiopia.”24 Almost all Oromo journalists are either in prison
or killed, or in exile. The regime also banned Oromo musical groups and all professional
associations.
Expanding their political repression, regional authorities formed quasi-government
institutions known as gott and garee to maintain tighter political control of Oromia; they
“imposed these new structures on . . . [rural] communities . . . . More disturbing, regional
authorities are using the gott and garee to monitor the speech and personal lives of the rural
population, to restrict and control the movements of residents, and to enforce farmers’ attendance
at ‘meetings’ that are thinly disguised OPDO political rallies.”25 Generally speaking, the Meles
government has continued to eliminate or imprison politically conscious and self-respecting
Oromos. Today, thousands of Oromos are in official and secret prisons simply because of their
nationality and their resistance to injustice. After jailed and released from prison after six years,
Seye Abraha, the former Defense Minister of the regime who had previously participated in the
massacring and imprisoning thousands of Oromos, testified on January 5, 2008, to his audience
in the state of Virginia in the U. S. that “esir betu Oromigna yinager,” (“the prison speaks
Oromiffa [the Oromo language]”) and also noted that “about 99% of the prisoners in Qaliti are
Oromos.”26
The Tigrayan state bureaucrats believe that Oromo intellectuals, businessmen and
women, conscious Oromo farmers, students, and community and religious leaders are their
24
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enemies, and, hence, should be eliminated through terrorism and genocide.27 State terrorism is
associated with issues of control over territory and resources and the construction of political and
ideological domination.28 State terrorism manifests itself as lethal violence in the form of war,
assassination, murder, castration, burying alive, throwing off cliffs, hanging, torture, rape,
poisoning, forcing people to submission by intimidation, beating, and disarmament of citizens.29
The methods of killing include burning, bombing, the cutting of throats or arteries in the neck,
strangulation, shooting, and the burying of people up to their necks in the ground. The agents and
militia of Meles have burned houses and entire villages, exterminating thousands of Oromo men,
women, and children.
The Meles regime also practices different forms of torture on imprisoned Oromos and
others. Former prisoners have testified that their arms and legs were tied tightly together on their
backs and their naked bodies were whipped; large containers or bottles filled with water were
fixed to their testicles, or if they were women, bottles or poles were pushed into their vaginas.30
There were prisoners who were locked up in empty steel barrels and tormented with heat in the
tropical sun during the day and with cold at night.31 There were also prisoners who were forced
into pits so that fire could be made on top of them.32 The cadres, soldiers, and officials of the
regime have frequently raped Oromo girls and women to demoralize them and their communities
and to show how Tigrayan rulers and their collaborators wielded limitless power. As Bruna
Fossati, Lydia Namarra and Peter Niggli report, "in prison women are often humiliated and
mistreated in the most brutal fashion. Torturers ram poles or bottles into their vaginas, connect
electrodes to the lips of their vulva, or the victims are dragged into the forest and gang-raped by
interrogation officers."33
Ethiopian soldiers have collected young Oromo girls and women into concentration
camps and gang raped them in front of their relatives, fathers, brothers, and husbands to
humiliate them and the Oromo people. State-sanctioned rape is a form of terrorism. The use of
sexual violence is also a tactic of genocide that a dominant ethnonational group practices in order
to destroy a subordinate ethnonational group. What Catherine MacKinnon says about ethnic
cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina applies to the sexual abuse of Oromo women by
the Tigrayan-led regime: “It is also rape unto death, rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make
the victims wish they were dead. It is rape as an instrument of forced exile, rape to make you
27
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leave your home and never want to go back. It is rape to be seen and heard and watched and told
to others: rape as spectacle. It is rape to drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a society,
to destroy a people. It is rape as genocide.”34
The Tigrayan-led regime has used various mechanisms in repressing, controlling and
destroying the Oromo people. It has imprisoned or killed thousands of Oromo women and men.
Its agents have murdered prominent community leaders and left their corpses for hyenas by
denying them burial to impose terror on the Oromo people. Furthermore, relatives of the
murdered Oromos are not allowed to cry publicly to express their grievances, a once cultural
practice.35 For instance, in 2007, the Meles militia killed twenty Oromos and left their corpses
for hyenas on the mountain of Suufi in Eastern Oromia.36 According to Human Rights Watch,
“Since 1992, security forces have imprisoned thousands of Oromo on charges of plotting armed
insurrection on behalf of the OLF. Such accusations have regularly been used as a transparent
pretext to imprison individuals who publicly question government policies or actions. Security
forces have tortured many detainees and subjected them to continuing harassment and abuse for
years after their release. That harassment in turn has often destroyed victims’ ability to earn a
livelihood and isolated them from their communities.”37
The Meles regime has even targeted Oromia’s environment and its animals. According to
Mohammed Hassen,
Oromo men, women, children, animals, and even the Oromo environment are all targets of the TPLF’s
tyranny. In cases where Oromo pastoralists were suspected of harboring OLF guerrilla fighters, TPLF
soldiers punished them by destroying or confiscating their cattle or by poisoning the wells from which the
cattle drank. On many occasions Oromo farmers, suspected of feeding OLF fighters, saw their farms
burned to the ground and the defenseless members of their households brutally murdered. In 2000, when
the TPLF government suspected OLF guerrillas of hiding in the forests of Oromia, its agents set fires that
caused catastrophic environmental destruction in Oromia and other states in southern Ethiopia.38

In addition to such environmental destruction and the murdering and raping of Oromos, the
Meles regime has engaged in the genocidal massacres of Oromos. This regime has engaged in
such crimes with little or no opposition from Western powers, particularly the United States. All
these crimes against humanity are committed in the name of democracy and development.
Article II of the United Nations Convention defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”39
Kurt Jonassohn explains genocide as the planned destruction of any economic, political
or social group.40 According to Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, “GENOCIDE is a form of one34
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sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that and
membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.”41 Chalk and Jonassohn identify two major types
of genocide:42 the first type is used to colonize and maintain an empire by terrorizing people
perceived to be real or potential enemies. In this case, the main purpose of practicing genocide is
to acquire land and other valuable resources. Then the maintenance of colonial domination by
state elites requires the establishment of a cultural and ideological hegemony that can be
practiced through genocidal massacres. By destroying elements of a population that resists
colonial domination, hegemony can be established on the surviving population. This is the
second type of genocide; this form of genocide is called ideological genocide. Jonassohn notes
that ideological genocide develops “in nation-states where ethnic groups develop chauvinistic
ideas about their superiority and exclusiveness.”43
The Tigrayan-led government sees Oromia as part of its empire, controls all of Oromia’s
resources, and attacks the Oromo since it perceives them as its potential or real enemies. It
engages in genocide as Chalk and Johnassohn explain above with the intention of destroying the
part of the Oromo nation composed of nationalists and leaders. Tigrayan state leaders are
claiming to promote political ideologies such as “revolutionary democracy” and “federalism,”
while at gunpoint attempting to legitimize Tigrayan ethnocracy and state power. They deny that
they engage in massive human rights violations by claiming that they are democrats and
revolutionaries and by also destroying the records of their political crimes. Johnassohn’s
description of a conspiracy of “collective denial” of genocide is applicable to the denial of the
occurrence of genocide in the Ethiopian Empire. According to Johnassohn, “There are many
reasons for this: (a) in many societies such materials are not written down, or are destroyed
rather than preserved in archives; (b) many perpetrators have recourse to elaborate means of
hiding the truth, controlling access to information, and spreading carefully contrived
disinformation; and (c) historically, most genocides were not reported because . . . there appears
to have existed a sort of conspiracy of ‘collective denial’ whereby the disappearance of a people
did not seem to require comment or even mention.”44
While the Tigrayan regime attempts to eliminate Oromo leaders through genocide in
order to deny the Oromo their own political leadership, it prepares Tigrayan children for
positions of leadership by providing them access to better education. This regime also limits
educational opportunities to Oromo children to maintain racial/ethnic division of labor. Although
it is impossible to know exactly at this time how many Oromos have been murdered by the
Meles government, Mohammed Hassen estimates that between 1992 and 2001, about 50,000
killings and 16,000 disappearances (euphemism for secret killings) took place in Oromia; he also
notes that 90 percent of the killings were not reported.45 The Meles government hides its criminal
activities and “does not keep written records of its extrajudicial executions and prolonged
detention of political prisoners.”46 Furthermore, the massive killings and genocide committed on
the Sheko, Mezhenger, Sidama, Annuak, and Ogaden Somali peoples have shocked some
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sections of the international community.47 According to the Associated Press, Meles Zenawi and
his followers are possible targets of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as are many leaders
of African countries.48
The president of Genocide Watch, Gregory Stanton, wrote on March 23, 2009, an open
letter to the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights admiring the action that the
ICC took in issuing a warrant for the arrest of President Omar al-Bashir of the Sudan and calling
upon them to investigate the crimes Meles and his government have committed and still are
committing against humanity in the Horn of Africa:
The action that the International Criminal Court has taken in this situation has restored hope to peace and
justice loving people, affirming that international human rights law not only exists on paper, but in reality.
It also sends an important message to perpetrators throughout the world that impunity for their crimes is not
assured forever; which may be a primary reason that one of the first leaders to defend Omar al-Bashir and
condemn the warrant was Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, whose government has also been
implicated in a pattern of widespread perpetration of serious human rights atrocities in Ethiopia and in
Somalia. He and those within his government may be keenly aware of their own vulnerability to similar
actions by the ICC in the future that could upend a deeply entrenched system of government-supported
impunity that has protected perpetrators from any accountability.49

Stanton demonstrates in this letter how the Meles government has committed heinous
crimes by being involved “in the inciting, the empowerment or the perpetration of crimes against
humanity, war crimes and even genocide, often justified by them as ‘counter-insurgency.” He
also states that the Meles government organized Ethiopian National Defense Forces and civilian
militia groups to ruthlessly massacre 424 persons from the Annuak people in Gambella on
December 2003 in order to suppress opposition and to “exclude them from any involvement in
the drilling for oil on their indigenous land.” According to Stanton, as militia groups chanted
“Today is the day for killing Annuak,” both the military and militias used machetes, axes and
guns to kill the unarmed victims, frequently raping the women while chanting, “Now there will
be no more Annuak children.”
Reports from Amnesty International, the U.S. State Department, and the Human Rights
Watch have been continuing to list Zenawi’s government extensive record of chilling crimes
against the politically and economically oppressed peoples such as the Oromo. The Meles regime
recently passed the so-called anti-terrorism law to legalize its crimes against humanity and to
legally intensify its own repressive and terrorist activities. Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism “law could
provide the Ethiopian government with a potent instrument to crack down on political dissent,
including peaceful political demonstrations and public criticisms of government policy that are
deemed supportive of armed opposition activity.” 50 Generally speaking, the policies and
practices of the Meles regime have forced millions of Oromos to become political refugees in
Asia, Europe, Australia, and North America.
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The alliance of the West with this regime has frightened neighboring countries such as
Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, and Yemen, and turned them against the Oromo struggle and Oromo
refugees. Using the leverage of Western countries, the Meles regime has pressured neighboring
governments to return or expel Oromo refugees from their countries. The United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has even failed to provide reasonable protection for
thousands of Oromo refugees in Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. For example, on
December 21 and 22, 2000, while five thousand Oromo refugees were refouled to Ethiopia, the
UNHCR office in Djibouti denied any violation of its mandate had occurred.51 Between 2000
and 2004, hundreds of Oromo refugees were forced to return to Ethiopia from Djibouti to face
imprisonment or death.52 “The continuing refoulement of refugees from Djibouti,” notes the
Oromia Support Group, “especially the large scale refoulement of December 2000 and the 28
associated deaths by asphyxiation and shooting, should be publicly acknowledged by UNHCR
and the Djibouti government.”53 The security agents of Ethiopia and neighboring countries still
capture thousands of Oromo refugees and return them to Ethiopia.
By crossing borders and entering Somalia and Kenya, agents of the Ethiopian regime
assassinated prominent Oromo leaders. And still today, the regime is killing prominent Oromos
in Kenya and Somalia. Just in 2007 and 2008, Ethiopian security forces assassinated Oromos in
Somalia and Kenya. One human rights organization notes that on February 5, 2008, the
combined security forces of Ethiopia and Puntland, Somalia, bombed two hotels and
consequently murdered 65 Oromo refugees and seriously injured more than 100 people.54 In
2009, the regime killed four Oromos by poisoning their food in Puntland.55
When it comes to the Oromo, international organizations do not pay attention even if
terrorist attacks occur and international laws are broken. The Oromo are being denied sanctuary
in neighboring countries and are also even being denied the right to be refugees to some degree.
Since some Oromo refugees are not welcomed by neighboring countries and international
organizations, there are thousands of `internal’ Oromo refugees in Oromia and Ethiopia. Fleeing
from Ethiopian state terrorism, these internal refugees hide in the bushes and remote villages.
Suspecting that these internal refugees support the Oromo national struggle, the regime attempts
to control their movements and the movement of other Oromos.
When the Meles regime has been mobilizing the West and the imperial system and using
their resources terrorizing and controlling the Oromo, the revolutionary nationalist Oromo elites
have failed to consolidate the Oromo national struggle because of their ideological confusion and
political fragmentation. As we shall see below, due to the lack of coherent, pragmatic, and strong
political leadership, the Oromo national movement faces challenges from the unstable
authoritarian-terrorist regime of Meles Zenawi. Moreover, the Oromo national struggle has
created political and economic opportunities for those reactionary and opportunist Oromos who
promote their personal and group interests by allying with and working for the Meles regime at
the cost of the Oromo nation.
The sad thing is that the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian government loots Oromian economic and
natural resources to pay for the Oromo collaborators it organized as the OPDO to do its dirty job
in Oromia. Had the Oromo national struggle built itself as a more unified, structured, and strong
movement, the umbilical cord that links Oromo society to its enemy could have been cut. Today
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the Oromo collaborators that are stuffed in the OPDO mainly maintain such links. Until these
“social cancers” exist in Oromo society, it cannot be imagined to liberate Oromia from Ethiopian
settler colonialism. These dangerous social elements survive in Oromo society because of the
failure of the revolutionary nationalist Oromo elites in establishing a more unified and structured
organization and leadership that can mobilize most of the Oromo people to defend their national
interest. At the same time, the fire of Oromummaa survives and expands because of the few
selfless and determined Oromo nationalists. However, such nationalist leaders need to expand
their mental horizons to re-map and reinvent the Oromo national movement by providing a
centralized structured organization and leadership by mobilizing all organizational, cultural, and
material resources of the Oromo for national survival and self-defense.
The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Oromo Elites
As I have explained above, the indigenous independent Oromo leadership was destroyed or
suppressed by the Ethiopian colonial system until the mid-20th century. At the same time, the
Ethiopian colonial system created the Oromo collaborative class and imposed on Oromo society.
Furthermore, the Ethiopian political system was designed to produce, through its educational
institutions, a small number of Ethiopianized Oromo leaders who would function as
intermediaries between the Ethiopian ruling class and the Oromo people. It intentionally limited
the number of formally educated Oromo leaders by denying education to the overwhelming
majority of Oromos. Through various political and cultural mechanisms, including assimilation,
political marriage, religion, and divide and conquer policies, the Ethiopian government
disconnected most of the few educated Oromo vassals from their cultural and historical roots,
continuously forcing them to show fealty to their suzerain.
Only a few persons within nationalist circles clearly understood these complex problems
by familiarizing themselves with Oromo history, culture, values, and various forms of the Oromo
resistance to Ethiopian colonialism. These elements initiated the Oromo national movement in
the early 1960s and the 1970s. Some of those who emerged as Oromo nationalist leaders were
sometimes collaborators who were initially neutral or opposed to the Oromo nationalist
movement because of their lack of political consciousness. Generally speaking, Oromo
collaborative leaders have ensconced themselves in Oromo cities that have been overwhelmingly
populated by Ethiopian colonial settlers. Ethiopian political, religious, educational, and media
institutions have had powerful influence on most of this educated Oromo collaborator leadership.
Consequently, some educated Oromos have joined Ethiopian political organizations and
institutions.
The Ethiopian and Somali governments and other forces opposed to the Oromo
emancipation; opportunist and reactionary Oromo vassals collaborated with these enemies and
targeted the few Oromo nationalist intellectuals. Consequently, the founding leadership of the
Macca-Tuulama Self-help Association (MTSA) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was
decimated along with the membership of these organizations. In addition, within the Oromo
nationalist camp, complex political problems and confusions emerged in the 1970s, 1980s,
1990s, and recently in 2001 and 2008 because of the low level and uneven development of
Oromummaa, the lack of political experience and maturity, and political opportunism. A few
individuals, using clan or religious or regional politics have corrupted the movement by
introducing conflict, suspicion, and other factors. Such problems have undermined the
development of the Oromo national struggle. As a result, Oromo nationalists have been divided
into camps that started to fight one another while fighting against the Ethiopian and other anti12

Oromo forces. In the process, the Oromo national movement has lost outstanding Oromo
nationalist heroes and heroines.
Despite political fragmentation, ideological confusion, and multiplicity of enemies, the
few Oromo nationalists who have survived the political onslaught from all directions managed to
maintain the Oromo national movement, particularly the OLF. The political integrity and
determination of some OLF leaders and members have allowed the movement to spread the
concepts of Oromummaa and Oromo nationalism among the Oromo people.56 When the Oromo
people have accepted the OLF, the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian government and other semi-fascist
groups have attempted to totally destroy the Oromo national movement and Oromo nationalists.
The leadership of the Oromo national movement wasn’t prepared to face this political challenge;
some of the reasons include (1) the lack of coherent and organic leadership or team leadership;
(2) the absence of open and honest dialogue; (3) the low level and uneven development of
Oromummaa and the lack of political, cultural, and ideological strategies with which to build
Oromummaa; (4) the absence of accountability of some leaders and followers; (5) the attachment
to borrowed political culture and ideologies; (6) the failure to mobilize Oromo human and
material resources effectively, and (7) the absence of a more unified structured organization and
matured leadership.
The Oromo national movement has been lacking a coherent and organic leadership as the
result of the untimely death of some of its founding leaders such as Haile Mariam Gamada,
Mamo Mazamir, Taddassa Biru, Baro Tumsa, Elemo Qilixu, Magarasa Bari, Demisie Techane,
Aboma Mitiku, and Muhee Abdo. Despite the fact that there are Oromo political leaders who are
well educated, to date they have not developed the organizational norms and culture of teamwork
needed to conceptualize the theoretical, ideological and organizational concepts necessary to
address the problems of Oromo leadership. The lack of coherent political leadership has denied
the Oromo national movement the possibility of developing the formal and informal, political
and social networks that can effectively help in developing Oromummaa and in taking collective
political actions at the individual, relational and collective levels. Since the formal and informal
networks have not been integrated, members of the Oromo political leadership have been unable
to develop the organizational capacity necessary to engage in political dialogue and activities
both in formal and informal settings.
The Oromo elites whether they are in leadership or not lack ideological coherence,
political maturity, and skills for consensus building. They focus on their narrow perceptions and
agendas. Hence they jump to form organizations that promote such perceptions and agendas at
the cost of the national interest. In the 1970s, some Oromo elites joined Ethiopian and Somali
organizations while a few created the OLF. Furthermore, the lack of ideological and political
maturity led to the division of the OLF in the 1970s, and recently, in the 2001 and 2008. Without
creating the Oromo national power, the Oromo elites fight on non-existence power. The Oromo
elites have formed several nominal liberation fronts and other political organizations without
engaging in armed and real political struggles. They did not yet establish a political and cultural
mechanism that helps in resolving their contradictions. The Oromo elites have failed to
understand that they are on one team that must work together to organize the Oromo nation for
its liberation.
It is impossible to build an effective institutional order or organization without integrating
formal and informal rules of the society. As a result of the lack of bureaucratic codes and
56
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procedures in Oromo tradition, Oromo political leaders and the Oromo community at-large have
had no immediately-available, culturally-consistent models to draw upon when confronted with
the need for establishing the bureaucratic structures that are an essential part of the overall
liberation struggle. As a result, they have reacted in a number of different and contradictory
ways. This lack of coherence in the leadership in turn has created conditions in which suspicion
has flourished creating conditions that have prevented open and honest dialogue among leaders
and between leaders and followers. In absence of a coherent organizational milieu, rumor,
gossip, and impression management have replaced a critical and open dialogue within the
movement. Like any movement, the Oromo national movement must develop a collective
identity that results in collective action. Oromo nationalists cannot develop an Oromummaa that
facilitates collective action without critical discussion and open dialogue.
The role of the leader is very important in building a leadership core through persuasion,
analytical capacity, capacity to communicate, and capacity to listen and learn. The leader is
responsible for the creation of formal and informal networks that allow for the development of
an effective leading political team by bringing together layers of people who share strategic ideas
to win over others. Recently, the Oromo movement has tried to create an exclusivist leadership
that does not fit Oromo-centric democratic values. While the Oromo love their heroes and
heroines and admire them, they expect open dialogue and interaction consistent with their
democratic political tradition. The Oromo also reject the leadership style of the Habasha. The
Oromo dislike exclusivist leaders who equate their personal interests with the interests of the
organization they lead and separate themselves from the rank and file members. Colin Barker
argues that exclusivist leaders “regard their offices as private property, resisting removal or
control. To maintain their positions, they develop various means of control . . . The overall result
is that the mechanism of organization becomes an end in itself.”57
Practically speaking, the Oromo political leadership is neither coherent nor exclusivist,
although there has been an attempt by a few leaders to develop an exclusivist leadership modeled
on the Habasha political culture. However, there is no question that the leadership of the Oromo
national movement manifests some exclusivist characters. Just as the Oromo nationalist
leadership lacks political coherence, some Oromos lack organizational discipline and engage in
political anarchism or passivism. Without challenging anarchism and passivism among the
Oromo populace and the exclusivist political tendency of the leadership, the Oromo nationalist
movement cannot search “for combinations of forms of organization and leadership which are
practically compatible with larger struggles for popular self-emancipation.”58 Oromo nationalists
need to speak up and struggle to develop leadership for self-emancipation through facilitating the
integration of “leading” and “led” selves of the Oromo political leadership.
While struggling to build a democratic and coherent political leadership, Oromo
nationalists must fight against political anarchism, passivism, and anti-leadership sentiment that
emerge in some Oromo sectors. Anarchist and anti-leadership Oromo elites discourage the
emergence of strong leadership by engaging in endless debate on secondary issues—such as
clan, religious, and regional identity—and by making personal attacks on prominent Oromo
leaders and organizations as a means of avoiding substantive debate. While demanding
accountability from their leadership, Oromos must fight publicly against an anti-leadership
ideology. Oromos need to acknowledge, value, encourage, and support an emerging democratic
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Oromo political leadership since strengthening the leadership of the Oromo movement is
essential in the struggle to defeat dangerous enemies. Since an amorphous and less structured
leadership is functionally ineffective, the Oromo national struggle must have a more structured
leadership that can provide the organizational capacity necessary to eventually take state power
and establish a functioning democracy consistent with the principles of Oromummaa.
Oromo nationalists cannot build a more structured leadership without clearly
understanding the processes of leadership and followership. According to Robert G. Lord and
Douglas J. Brown, “Leaders may indeed be people who can be understood in terms of traits and
behavioral styles, but leadership is a social process that involves both a leader and a follower.”59
Just as Oromo leaders do not adequately understand the essence and characteristics of their
followers, the followers lack information about their leaders and leadership. While Oromo
political leaders like to lecture their followers and sympathizers, they are less interested in
establishing formal and informal relationships with their followers and sympathizers in order to
engage them in dialogical conversation. Because they care little about the opinions and
experiences of their followers, they fail to ask for the input from their followers. But, as Lord
and Brown argue, leaders cannot be effective without establishing “a stronger social bond among
their direct and indirect followers, thus improving the direct and indirect followers’
performance.”60
Leadership is a processing of influencing followers and others by changing their
perceptions through closely relating and communicating with them. Similarly, much of the
Oromo populace has yet to developed constructive mechanisms by which they can influence
their political leaders and hold them accountable. As a result, they engage in personal attacks and
debate on peripheral issues blunting the impact of their personal political efforts and delaying the
development of an effective political leadership. As we have seen, it is difficult to identify the
weaknesses of the leadership without identifying those of the followership. I recognize that the
role played by the Oromo national political leadership is dangerous, complex, and difficult. This
leadership has been politically, ideologically, and militarily attacked both internally and
externally. To date the movement has been able to survive by developing shared meaning,
purpose, language, and symbols. But as the complexity of the Oromo movement increases and as
the number of Oromo nationalists expands, the leadership will not be able to improve its
organizational capacity without simultaneously developing a degree of internal cohesion,
leadership expertise, and widespread support through the establishment of effective coalitions
within and beyond the Oromo nationalist movement.
Without (1) changing the past habits, ideologies and approaches, (2) building internal
cohesion by developing Oromummaa on the individual, relational and collective levels, and (3)
fully mobilizing Oromo human and economic resources, the current Oromo political leadership
will continue to face more crises and may eventually become a political liability. The Oromo
national political leadership must be challenged to abandon its reliance on a narrow political
circle and borrowed political ideologies and practices. In addition, it must be encouraged to
embrace Oromo-centric democratic values, using them to develop different forms of
organizational leadership in Oromo society thus making the dynamic connection between the
values of Oromo society and its organizational structure.

59

Robert G. Lord and Douglas Brown, Leadership Processes and Followers Self-Identity, (Mahwal, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associate, Inc.: 2004), p. 3.	
  
60
Ibid, p. 5.

15

The Oromo leadership should be pressured to speak with the Oromo people and listen as
well, allowing the Oromo community at-large to engage in the process of self-emancipation by
participating in and owning their national movement. According to Alan Johnson, “Selfemancipation is a political process in which the oppressed author their own liberation through
popular struggles which are educational, producing a cognitive liberation” to defeat their
enemies.61 More than any time in its history, the Oromo national struggle now requires a more
centralized structured organization and matured national leadership that can learn about the
Oromo people in order to organize and lead them to take any necessary actions for national
survival and liberation.
The Main Characteristics of Oromo Society
After the Oromo were colonized and until Oromo nationalism emerged, Oromoness
(Oromumma) primarily remained on the personal and the interpersonal levels since the Oromo
were denied the opportunities to form national institutions. Oromoness was targeted for
destruction and colonial administrative regions that were established to suppress the Oromo
people and exploit their resources were glorified and institutionalized. As a result, Oromo
relational identities have been localized, and not strongly connected to the collective identity of
national Oromummaa.
The Oromo have been separated from one another and prevented from exchanging goods
and information on national level for more than a century. Their identities have been localized
into clan families and colonial regions. They were also exposed to different cultures (i.e.,
languages, customs, values, etc.) and religions and adopted some elements of these cultures and
religions. Consequently, today there are members of Oromo society and elites who have
internalized clan and externally imposed regional or religious identities because of their low
level of political consciousness or political opportunism, and the lack of clear understanding of
Oromummaa or Oromo nationalism. What makes these problems complex is that some Oromos
who claim that they are nationalists confuse their sub-identities with the Oromo national identity.
Oromo relational identities include extended families and clan families. Historically and
culturally speaking, Oromo clans and clan families never had clear geopolitical boundaries
among themselves. Consequently, there are clans in Oromo society that have the same name in
southern, central, northern, western and eastern Oromia. For example, there are Jarso, Gida,
Karayu, Galan, Nole and Jiru clans all over Oromia. The Ethiopian colonial system and
borrowed cultural and religious identities were imposed on the Oromo creating regional and
religious boundaries. Consequently, there were times when Christian Oromos were more
identified with Habashas and Muslim Oromos were more identified with Arabs, Adares and
Somalis than they were with other Oromos. Under these conditions, Oromo personal identities,
such as religion replaced Oromoness, central Oromo values, and core Oromo self-schemas.
There are Oromos who still confuse such identities with the Oromo central identity.
Colonial rulers saw Oromoness as a source of raw material that was ready to be
transformed into other identities. In the colonial process, millions of Oromos lost their identities
and assimilate to other peoples. Consequently, the number of Amharas, Tigres, Adares, Gurages,
and Somalis has increased at the cost of the Oromo population. The Oromo self was attacked and
distorted by Ethiopian colonial institutions. The attack on Oromo selves at personal,
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interpersonal and collective-levels has undermined the self-confidence of some Oromo
individuals by creating an inferiority complex within them. Without the emancipation of Oromo
individuals from this inferiority complex and without overcoming the ignorance and the
worldviews that their enemies imposed on them, they cannot have the self-confidence necessary
to facilitate individual liberation and Oromo emancipation.
Because of internal cultural crises and external oppressive institutions, Oromo collective
norms or organizational culture is at rudimentary level at this historical moment. So some
comrades in an Oromo organization do not see themselves as members of a team, and they
engage in undermining members in their team through gossips and rumors. For sake of selfpromotion, they belittle their comrades in his or her absence. Such individuals do not have strong
organizational culture or norm. Such individuals cannot develop a core of Oromo leadership that
is required in building a strong liberation organization.
Today, the Oromo are diverse and heterogeneous people, and it is impossible to organize
them for liberation without understanding these complexities. Some Oromo elites do not
understand these issues. Collective identities are not automatically given, but they are “essential
outcomes of the mobilization process and crucial prerequisite to movement success.”62 Oromo
nationalists can only reach a common understanding of Oromoness through open, critical, honest
dialogue and debate. Fears, suspicions, misunderstandings and hopes or aspirations of Oromo
individuals or groups should be discussed through invoking Oromo cultural memory and
democratic principles. Through such discussion a single standard that respects the dignity and
inalienable human rights of all persons with respect to political, social, and economic interaction
should be established for all Oromos and their neighbors who support the rights to national selfdetermination.
Oromo personal and social identities can be fully released and mobilized for collective
actions if reasonable Oromos recognize that they can freely start to shape their future aspirations
or possibilities without discrimination. This is only possible through developing an Oromo
identity on personal and collective levels that is broader and more inclusive than gender, class,
clan, family, region, and religion. According to S.M. Buechler, “one critical intervening process
which must occur to get from oppression to resistance is the social construction of a collective
identity which unites a significant segment of the movement’s potential constituency.”63 While
recognizing the unity of Oromo peoplehood, it is important to recognize the existence of
diversity in Oromo society. The lack of open dialogue among Oromo nationalists, political
leaders, activists, and ordinary citizens on the issue of religious differences and/or the problems
of colonial regional identities provided opportunities for those who profit from the continued
subjugation of the Oromo people to employ a divide and conquer strategy by exploiting religious
and regional differences among the Oromo people.
Since Turks, Arabs, Habashas, and Europeans imposed both Islam and Christianity on the
Oromo in order to psychologically control and dominate them, Oromo nationalists must
encourage an open dialogue among adherents of an indigenous Oromo religion, Islam and
Christianity and reach a common understanding of what it means to be an Oromo and the
positive role religion can play in Oromo society. Also, issues of clans and colonial regional
identities must be addressed openly and honestly. Since these issues are not openly addressed,
reactionary forces and opportunist Oromo individuals and groups turn Oromo on one another to
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use them. Basing our understanding of these Oromo issues on Oromummaa eliminates
differences that may emerge because of religious plurality and regional differences. The
Ethiopian colonial regions do not correspond to Oromo group or regional identities. As a result
the political diversity of Oromo society can and should transcend regional identities based on the
boundaries of colonial regions.
The Oromo political problems have emerged primarily from low level of political
consciousness, attitudes, behavior, and perceptions that have been shaped by a culture that
valued domination and exploitation and have seen diversity and equality as threats to the colonial
institutions most Oromos passed through. These problems still play a significant role in
undermining the development of Oromummaa and the organizational capacity of the Oromo
national movement. The behavior and political practices of most Oromos and elites and leaders
of Oromo institutions in the Diaspora—like churches and mosques, associations, and political
and community organizations—demonstrate that the impact of the ideology of domination and
control that was impacted by Ethiopian colonial institutions and organizations is far-reaching.
Despite the fact that the Oromo are proud of their democratic tradition, their behavior and
practices in politics, religion, and community affairs indicate that they have learned more from
Habashas and Oromo chiefs than from the gada system of democracy.
While the social and cultural construction of the Oromo collective identity is ongoing
process, this process cannot be completed without the recognition that Oromo society is
composed of a set of diverse and heterogeneous individuals and groups with a wide variety of
cultural and economic experiences. Hence, Oromo nationalists need to recognize and value the
diversity and unity of the Oromo people because “people who participate in collective action do
so only when such action resonates with both an individual and a collective identity that makes
such action meaningful.”64 In every society, personal and social identities are flexible, and are
not rigid and monolithic. Similarly, Oromo self-identity exists at the personal, interpersonal, and
collective levels with this confederation of identity being continuously shaped by Oromo
historical and cultural memory, current conditions, and hopes and aspirations for the future.
According to Robert G. Lord and Douglas J. Brown, the self “is believed to be a system or a
confederation of self-schemas that are derived from past experience . . . . In essence, the self is a
collection of small, relatively independent processing units that are elicited in different contexts
and each of which has specific cognitive, emotional, motivational, and behavioral
consequences.”65
The Oromo social selves emerge from the interplay between intimate personal relations
and less personal relations. The former comprise the interpersonal or relational identity and the
latter are a collective identity. The relational-level identity is based on perceptions or views of
others about an individual. Thus, individual Oromos have knowledge of themselves from their
personal viewpoints as well as knowledge from the perspective of significant others and larger
social groups. The concept of individual self emerges from complex conditions that reflect past
and present experiences and future possibilities. The self-concept allows individuals to have “the
capacity to reinstate a past situation and locate themselves in it; they also have the capacity to
project the self into future contexts, anticipating possible actions and their consequences for the
self.” 66 Some Oromos are more familiar with their personal and relational selves than they are
with their Oromo collective self, because their level of Oromummaa is rudimentary.
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Oromo individuals have intimate relations with their family members, friends, and local
communities. These interpersonal and close relations foster helping, nurturing, and caring
relationships. Without developing these micro-relationships into the macro-relationship of
Oromummaa, the building of Oromo national organizational capacity is illusive. Organizing
Oromos requires learning about the multiplicity and flexibility of Oromo identities and
fashioning from them a collective identity that encompasses the vast majority of the Oromo
populace. This process can be facilitated by an Oromo political leadership that is willing to
develop an understanding of the breadth of the diversity of Oromo society looking for those
personal and relational identities that can be used to construct an Oromo collective identity,
expanding Oromummaa. Change starts with individuals who are both leaders and followers.
Culture, collective grievances, and visions connect leaders and followers in oppressed
society like the Oromo. Consequently, to be effective the Oromo political leadership must be
guided by Oromo-centric cardinal values and principles that reflect honesty, fairness, single
standard, equality and democracy in developing Oromummaa. Lord and Brown assert that “a
critical task for leaders may be to construct group identities for followers that are both appealing
and consistent with a leader’s goals. Indeed, this is a critical aspect of political leadership.
Effective political leaders do not simply take context and identity as given, but actively construct
both in a way that reconfigures the social world.”67 The political leadership of Oromo society
needs to understand the concept and essence of the changing selves of Oromos. These selfconcepts include cognitive, psychological and behavioral activities of Oromo individuals.
Collective grievances, the Oromo language and history, the historical memory of the
gada system and other forms of Oromo culture, and the hope for liberation have helped in
maintaining fragmented connections among various Oromo groups. The emergence of Oromo
nationalism from underground to public discourse in the 1990s allowed some Oromos to openly
declare their Oromummaa without clearly realizing the connection between the personal and
interpersonal selves and the Oromo collectivity. This articulation occurred without strong
national institutions and organizational capacity that can cultivate and develop Oromummaa
through transcending the political and religious barriers that undermine the collective identity of
the Oromo. Oromo nationalists cannot build effective national institutions and organizations
without taking Oromo personal, interpersonal and collective-level Oromo selves to a new level.
Oromo collective selves develop through relations with one another. Good interpersonal relations
and good treatment of one another create sense of security, confidence, sense of belonging,
strong and effective bonds, willingness to admit and deal with mistakes and increase
commitment to political objectives and organizations.
The individuality of an Oromo can be observed and examined in relation to the concept
of self which is linked to psychological processes and outcomes, such as motivation, affection,
self-management, information processing, interpersonal relations, commitment, dignity and selfrespect, self-preservation and so forth. The Oromo self-concept as an extensive knowledge
structure contains all pieces of information on self that an individual Oromo internalizes in his or
her value systems. Every Oromo has a self-schema or a cognitive schema that organizes both
perceptional and behavioral information. An individual’s self-schema can be easily captured by
accessible knowledge that comes to mind quickly to evaluate information on any issue. The
Oromo self is the central point at which personality, cognitive schema and social psychology
meet. The Oromo self consists both personal or individual and social identities. The former is
based on an individual’s comparison of oneself to other individuals and reveals one’s own
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uniqueness and the latter are based on self-definition in relation to others or through group
membership.
Without recognizing and confronting these issues at all levels, the Oromo movement
cannot build its organizational capacity. The social experiment of exploring and understanding
our internal selves at individual, relational and collective selves must start with the Oromo elites
who aspire to organize and lead the Oromo people. Since the ideological and organizational tools
that Oromo elites have borrowed from other cultures have reached their maximum limit of
capacities and cannot move the Oromo movement forward in the quest for achieving selfdetermination and human liberation, Oromo nationalists must reorganize their approaches based
on Oromummaa and gada democratic heritage. The Oromo elites have passed through schools
that were designed to domesticate or “civilize” them and to mold them into intermediaries
between the Oromo people and those who dominated and exploited them.
They have been disconnected from their history, culture, language, and worldviews, and
have been trained by foreign educational and religious institutions that glorified the culture,
history, language and religion of others. Consequently, some Oromo elites do not adequately
understand Oromo history, culture and worldview. Today, such individuals have emerged as
agents of the Tigrayan elites by joining the OPDO and are terrorizing the Oromo people.
Although the Oromo movement has achieved many important accomplishments, the
organizational and ideological tools that it has used did not provide an effective basis for
organizing the Oromo people and enabling them to defend themselves from their enemies. At
present, the Oromo human and material resources are scattered and used by the enemies of the
Oromo nation.
Without a structured organization and national leadership, the Oromo people cannot take
effective political actions that involve national self-defense and a popular and wide rebellion
through the total mobilization of the nation. For many generations, young Oromos have been
forced to fight as mercenaries and defended the interest of the Ethiopian state elites that have
repressed and exploited their society. Even the Siad Barre government of Somalia used Oromo
fighters as mercenaries. The Habasha elites and their Oromo collaborators claim that the Oromo
fighters have built Ethiopia, and hence they are Ethiopians like Amharas and Tigrayans. To be
forced to fight for their colonizers cannot make a people to share identity and to own a country
with their colonizers. Therefore, fighting for the Ethiopian state could not make Oromo fighters
equal citizens with their colonizers; the Ethiopian state they have fought for has maintained their
second-class citizenship status through violence. Therefore, the Oromo elites and society must
stop the utilization of the Oromo youth as raw materials by the Ethiopian state elites or others.
The Oromo national movement by learning from the gada system must be able to mobilize and
organize the Oromo youth to fight for the liberation of their nation and their fatherland, Oromia.
The Major Opportunities and Constraints for the Oromo Struggle
The Oromo national movement that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s by a few determined
nationalists reached the Oromo populace in the early 1990s. It took almost three decades and
heavy sacrifices in the lives and sufferings of these few nationalists to resurrect the Oromo name,
language, nationhood, and the name of Oromia from the dustbin of history. In this process,
Oromummma—Oromo national identity, culture, and nationalism—has been resurrected.
Currently, the external and internal enemies of the Oromo people use the resurrected names and
the Oromo language while attacking and suppressing the Oromo nationalists and self-respecting
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Oromos. Since they could not stop the rising wave of Oromummaa, the Tigrayan colonial elites
have used Oromo mercenaries to gradually destroy it.
Ethiopian colonialism had disconnected the Oromo nation from the international
community for more than a century. However, with the resurrection of the Oromo national
identity, culture, and nationalism, the Oromo people started to be represented in the world by its
political refugees. For the first time in Oromo history, the Oromo people started to have its
Diaspora that has a great potential to link Oromia to the global community. The OromoAmerican Citizens Council is an element of the Oromo Diaspora. The imposition of Ethiopian
state terrorism on the Oromo to suppress Oromo nationalism created and expanded the Oromo
Diaspora in the world. In this process, a few serious Oromo intellectuals emerged on the global
level and dug the graveyards of history to uncover Oromo history and culture and to publish
books and journals that are stored in world libraries. Furthermore, in Oromia, millions of the
qubee generation emerged as demonstrated by the recent Oromo student movement. The national
projects that were designed by the MTSA and the OLF produced fundamental results that have
become the cornerstones of the Oromo national struggle. These achievements are great political
opportunities for the Oromo nation.
Unfortunately, since the Oromo national struggle did yet achieve its main objectives, the
enemies of the Oromo people have created political constraints to abort the struggle. There are
millions of Oromos who have betrayed their nation to satisfy their economic interests. By
creating and building the OPDO and recruiting such Oromos to this subservient organization, the
Meles regime uses them to attack the OLF and to suppress and control the Oromo people. The
regime has also mobilized several ethnonations against the Oromo people and their movement.
There are also anti-Oromo forces such as Amhara colonial organizations and others who use any
opportunity to undermine the interest of the Oromo nation. The constraints of the Oromo
struggle are not limited to these problems. The Oromo national movement did not yet secure
adequate sympathy and support for the Oromo cause from the international community.
It is very clear that the Tigrayan-led government and its agents terrorize and rule the
Oromo not because of their strengths but because of the weaknesses of the Oromo movement,
political leadership, and Oromo society. If some elements of Oromo society are well organized
under one structured organization and leadership, they can rebel and dismantle the Meles regime
within a short period. The Tigrayan soldiers, cadres, and their agents can be easily dismantled in
Oromia if substantial numbers of Oromos engage in self-defense and coordinated uprising. If the
Oromo people intensify their struggle, the international community will recognize the political
problem of the Oromo nation. The Oromo people will achieve their national self-determination
by intensifying their national struggle by any means necessary and by receiving international
recognition.
The crisis of the Ethiopian Empire that started in the early 1970s still continues. The
popular uprisings of ethnonations, classes, and social groups challenged the collapsing Ethiopian
state for several decades and introduced some changes. These uprisings resulted in the
overthrowing of the Haile Selassie and Mengistu regimes and caused the emergence of the Meles
government and Tigrayan ethnocracy. But these changes failed to change the nature of Ethiopian
colonialism. Ethiopia is still ruled by an authoritarian-terrorist government that practices colonial
terrorism and clandestine genocide on the colonized peoples such as the Oromo, Somali, Sidama,
Annuak and others. The Tigrayan-led regime that emerged in 1991 has intensified the crisis of
the Ethiopian state and created the conditions that will give a death-below for this state. We
know that the Oromo nation lost its political opportunities in the 1970s and the 1990s and
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remained politically insignificant force. Are the Oromo political leadership, organizations, and
society ready to utilize the emerging political crisis that will emerge on the grave of the Meles
government?
Learning from the past experiences of the Ethiopian state, we can understand that the
Meles regime has already dug its own grave. This regime is already rotten from inside, and it
only survives because of the weaknesses of different political forces in the empire and financial
and diplomatic support it receive form powerful countries. What will happen if the Meles regime
collapses for whatever reason? Are the Oromo liberation fronts and political organizations ready
to use this political opportunity? Oromo nationalists, liberation fronts, political organizations,
community organizations and associations should start a serious national political dialogue to
overcome their political naiveté and immaturity in order to build a national political consensus
that will enable them to capture state power in Oromia by any means necessary and to build
multinational democracy with other nations that accept the principles of self-determination and
democracy. While preparing themselves to use any available political opportunity, the Oromo
national movement and society must start to fashion a national Gumii Gayyo to produce a
designed political results. These designed political results can be produced through
determination, hard work, sacrifice, and a collective effort of all Oromo liberation fronts,
political organizations, and associations.
	
  
What is the Future of the Oromo People?
The future of the Oromo people depends on what the Oromo liberation and political
organizations and society will do to assure the survivability of the Oromo nation and its
liberation from Ethiopian colonialism. The Oromo people have achieved what I have mentioned
above by the determination and sacrifices of a few nationalist Oromos. Had millions of Oromos
practically contributed their fare shares to the Oromo national movement, the level of the Oromo
struggle would have been on the highest level or Oromia would have achieved its liberation.
Furthermore, there are still millions of mercenary Oromos who are bleeding their nation by
serving the enemies of the Oromo people. As I have already mentioned, some Oromo elites have
promoted clan, regional or religious politics.
Currently, the mercenary Oromo elites promote the Tigrayan colonial objectives by
joining the Ethiopian military, the so-called parliament and government, educational, and
business institutions. Numerically Oromo mercenaries are the majority in the rubber-stamp
parliament and the regional government of Oromia; they endorse the so-called laws of the Meles
regime to enrich the Tigrayn region, Tigrayan elites and their domestic and international
collaborators. These mercenaries participate in the criminal activities of the Meles government
by taking marching order from their Tigrayan colonial masters. There are also Oromo
mercenaries in churches and mosques who use the name of God, but engage in domesticating the
minds of the Oromo to be subservient for their enemies. History demonstrates that churches and
mosques play important roles in defending the victimized people and encouraging them to be
united and struggle for their liberation. Several indigenous peoples around the world were
decimated mainly because their enemies divided and turned them against one another. The
colonized nations that could not defeat their traitors could not win their national victories.
If the politically consciousness Oromos start to fully contribute to the consolidation of the
Oromo national movement through building the more structured organization and leadership, the
Oromo nation will achieve its political victory. But, if the development Oromummaa is stagnated
by the fragmentation and the political immaturity of its elites, the survival of the Oromo nation is
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going to be in doubt. All Habasha elites want to destroy the Oromo national movement and its
independent leadership by any means necessary. So they hate the OLF and attempt to destroy
this organization and erase its name from the minds of the Oromo people. The Meles regime
spends its full energy, money, and intellectual power in dividing the Oromo and turning them
against their national struggle. The Tigrayan elites and their collaborators make an endless effort
to make the Oromo people leaderless so that they can own Oromia and exploit its resources.
Colonialist committed genocide on indigenous people to expropriate their countries and
resources in different parts of the world. Indigenous Americans and Australians and others were
destroyed by the mechanisms of divide and conquer, state terrorism and genocide and replaced
by the European settlers and their descendants. In the racialized capitalist world system might is
right. The international system is a toothless tiger and it cannot effectively defend peoples like
the Oromo who do not have state power. To overcome Tigrayan ethno-fascism and clandestine
genocide, the Oromo elites must overcome their political ignorance and immaturity and
consolidate the Oromo national movement into one structured organization and leadership in
order to mobilize and organize the nation to prepare it for an inevitable confrontation with the
enemy.
The future of the Oromo people will be decided by farsighted Oromo nationalists who
can take practical political actions both in Oromia and the Diaspora to defeat both the internal
and external enemies of the Oromo nation. Otherwise, the systematic destruction of the Oromo
people will continue in order to transfer Oromian lands and natural resources to Tigrayan-led
colonial settlers and their supporters. The Meles regime is attempting to give a final solution to
the Oromo question. It is up to the Oromo elites and people to stop this terrorist regime and to
determine their destiny as a nation. Those Oromos who believe in the existence of a free Oromia
must engage in self-defense by any means necessary in their country. Specifically building the
Oromo Liberation Army and Oromo self-defense forces is the priority of the day.
The Oromo Liberation Army and self-defense forces will lay the foundation of a
sovereign Oromia state that can establish a multinational democracy with other interested
peoples. The Diaspora Oromos must make adequate financial, intellectual and other
contributions to enable the victimized Oromos to defend themselves. Overall, Oromo nationalists
must start to reassess the tactics and strategies of their national struggle both in Oromia in the
Diaspora to engage in practical organizational, ideological, and diplomatic actions.
Unfortunately, those Oromos who are neutral and passive are indirectly contributing to the
demise of the Oromo people. The future of the Oromo people is not predetermined; those
committed Oromos who can take concrete liberation actions with whatever they can decide it.
When Oromo mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, and heroines and heroes are
massacred in their villages and/or languish in Ethiopian prisons; when Oromo girls and women
are violated and raped in their homes and communities and concentration camps; when Oromo
fertile lands, minerals, and natural resources are expropriated and transferred to colonial forces
and their international supporters; when the Oromo people are perishing by absolute poverty,
recurrent famines, malnutrition, and diseases, how can we be sure about the survival of the
Oromo nation? All Oromo elites who are in the nationalist camp, who are mercenaries, and
neutrals must realize that the Ethiopian “colonial school system educated [them to be] fools and
clowns, fascinated by the ideas and way of life” of their colonial masters. So they must be ready
to reevaluate their education, knowledge, and ideology in order to confront the challenges that
are facing their people. If the Oromo elites continue to be “fools and clowns” of the Amhara-
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Tigrayan elites, they first allow the destruction of the Oromo nation and then the destruction of
themselves. The Oromo elites cannot survive without the Oromo nation.
So what should the Oromo Diaspora in general the elites in particular should do to make
sure the survival of their nation and the victory of their national struggle? History demonstrates
that the determined people can liberate themselves. The Oromo elites in general and that of the
Diaspora in particular must start to determine the destiny of their nation by taking the following
concrete steps immediately. First, In the Diaspora, they must initiate town hall meetings in every
town where the Oromo community live and discuss about the fate of the Oromo people by
focusing in their achievements, failures, challenges, and constraints as a nation. In the Ethiopian
Empire, the Oromo people are denied the freedom of self-expression, organization, and the
media. Second, the Oromo in the Diaspora must stop the politics of self-destruction by avoiding
engaging in clan, religious, and regional politics, and by isolating the Oromo mercenaries from
every Oromo community.
Since the Oromo mercenaries use clan, religious, and regional politics to divide the
Oromo people and turn them against one another, the Oromo community must reject them and
their politics. The Oromo community must ostracize them by not relating to them and by
refusing to participate on their social events such as death and marriage. Every Oromo
community must identify, expose, and expel the Oromo mercenaries from their networks,
churches, mosques, associations, and other social worlds. Third, the Oromo Diaspora must
challenge the Oromo activists who have built their separate organizations in order to break down
barriers among different Oromo organizations and unite them under one structured organization
and leadership. Fourth, Oromo youth and women should be mobilized in order to actively
participate in national dialogues and town hall meetings; they must play a leading role since they
are less corrupted by the ideologies of egoism, clan, religious and regional politics.
Fifth, Oromo nationalists must establish the rule law fashioning on the principles of gada
and other democratic traditions to use it in running their national affairs. Sixth, since unconscious
people cannot liberate themselves from colonial domination, the Oromo Diaspora should receive
liberation knowledge through regular dialogues, seminars, conferences, workshops, lectures, and
study circles. The Oromo must learn their history, culture, language, and traditions; they also
need to learn about the world around them. At this historical moment, the number one enemy of
the Oromo people is political ignorance; Oromo nationalist must smash this enemy. When this is
accomplished, the Oromo people are going to play their historical role that will commensurate
with their number. When this sleeping giant nation will be awakened, others cannot use the
Oromos as raw materials. One of the main reasons why forty million Oromos are terrorized and
ruled by the elites that emerged from five million Tigrayans is lack political consciousness.
Seventh, every self-respecting Oromo must realize that he or she has power to determine
the destiny of Oromia. Every Oromo must be educated about his or her potential power and what
he or she must do to translate it to real power. Eighth, the Oromo Diaspora movement must start
building from bottom-up a confederation of Oromo political, religious, community, and self-help
organizations to create a Global Gumii Gayyo of Oromia that will contribute ideological,
organizational, and financial resources for consolidating the Oromo struggle and the Oromo
Liberation Army and self-defense militias in Oromia.
Ninth, all members of the Oromo Diaspora must engage in public diplomacy by
becoming members of organizations such as the Orom-American Citizens Council. Tenth,
Oromo nationalists in the Diaspora must start to build a well-regulated system that can provide
support and security for Oromos who are determined to advance the Oromo national interest
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whenever they face hardship beyond their control. Finally, the Oromo must believe that they will
liberate themselves by any means necessary. There is no any doubt that, despite hardships and
sacrifices, the Oromo “social volcano” that is being fermented will soon burn down Ethiopian
colonial structures that perpetuate terrorism, genocide, disease, absolute poverty, and
malnutrition in Oromia and beyond.
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